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Background: Vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) are still a concern in hospital units tending to seriously ill
patients. However, the cost-effectiveness of active surveillance program to identify asymptomatically VRE colonized
patient remains debatable. This work aims at evaluating the cost of a failure in the active surveillance of VRE that
had resulted in an outbreak in a French University Hospital.
Findings: A VRE outbreak was triggered by a failure in the systematic VRE screening in a medico-surgical ward
specialised in liver transplantation as a patient was not tested for VRE. This failure was likely caused by the
reduction of healthcare resource. The outbreak involved 13 patients. Colonized patients were grouped in a
dedicated part of the infectious diseases unit and tended by a dedicated staff. Transmission was halted within two
months after discovery of the index case.
The direct cost of the outbreak was assessed as the cost of staffing, disposable materials, hygiene procedures, and
surveillance cultures.
The loss of income from spare isolation beds was computed by difference with the same period in the preceding
year. Payments were drawn from the hospital database. The direct cost of the outbreak (2008 Euros) was €60 524
and the loss of income reached €110 915.
Conclusions: Despite this failure, the rapid eradication of the VRE outbreak was a consequence of the
rapid isolation of colonized patient. Yet, eradicating even a limited outbreak requires substantial efforts
and resources. This underlines that special attention has to be paid to strictly adhere to active
surveillance program.
Keywords: Active surveillance, Outbreak, Cost, Vancomycin-resistant EnterococcusIntroduction
Vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) are a still growing
concern in hospital units tending to seriously ill patients.
VRE are easily transmitted via healthcare workers’ hands or
clothes, or via contaminated instruments or environment
[1]. The risk of VRE colonization resulting in systemic in-
fection is substantially increased in immunosuppressed
subjects, such as cancer patients or transplant recipients* Correspondence: lelia.escaut@bct.aphp.fr
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reproduction in any medium, provided the or[2], and these infections are difficult to treat. Strategies
to prevent VRE transmission include the use of barrier
precaution, the isolation of colonized patients and
active surveillance cultures to identify asymptomatically
colonized patient. The effectiveness of active surveil-
lance cultures that are cumulative expensive and re-
source intensive, in reducing VRE transmission remains
controversial [3]. However, the non-compliance with
active surveillance programs may outweigh the added
expense of the program itself.
In this setting, this work evaluated the cost of a failure
in the active surveillance of VRE that had resulted in an
outbreak in a French University Hospital.Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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Setting
Paul Brousse hospital is a 716-bed (215 acute care beds)
university hospital in Paris area. The hepato-biliary centre
(HBC) is a 96-bed medico-surgical department, including a
15-bed intensive care unit (ICU), mainly involved in liver
transplantation. Non-ICU beds spread across two floors.
One of these receives liver transplant candidates and recip-
ients while the other is dedicated to digestive surgery. The
hospital also features a 20-bed infectious and tropical dis-
ease unit (IDU) located in a different building. In the first
floor of HBC, systematic VRE screening is performed at
the time of admission. Indeed, about 15% of patients hospi-
talized are foreigners, coming from geographical regions
such as Southern Europe where the highest rates of VRE
associated nosocomial infection have been reported [4].
A patient with end stage liver cirrhosis was admitted to
the HBC from a Portuguese hospital on 31 August 2008.
As there was no room on the floor devoted to liver trans-
plantation since some beds had been closed for the sum-
mer, he was assigned to the surgical floor. There, he was
not tested for VRE and no specific precautions were
implemented. He was later transferred to the hepatologic
floor where he was found colonized with an enteric vanA-
type vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium ten days
after his admission. Following this discovery, patients were
cohorted in the HBC by VRE status: positive, contacts or
unknown. Contact patients, defined as present in the same
sector or tended by the same staff as the index patient,
were tested for VRE colonization. A total of 294 patients in
the IDU and the HBC were screened for VRE colonization
though a six weeks period. Taking into account the time
needed to collect samples and to obtain results, two weeks
were initially necessary to detect the first three additional
patients colonized with the same strain. Consequently, it
was decided to isolate these patients in a dedicated part of
the IDU (12 beds) to maintain the surgical and liver trans-
plantation activities.
These patients were tended by a dedicated medical
and nursing staff. Strict contact precautions, hand hy-
giene, and disinfection procedures were implemented as
recommended by guidelines [1]. Surveillance cultures
were performed weekly on colonized patients and VRE-
negative contacts from the IDU and the HBC. VRE-
colonized patients were treated with a five-day course of
oral bacitracin-streptomycin. Antibiotic prescription was
monitored in the HBC and IDU in order to avoid un-
necessary selection of resistant pathogen strains.
Assessments
The staffing costs were evaluated as the overtime of staff
dedicated to VRE patients, including training of
healthcare and housing staff as well as information to
patients or patients’ families. Interim staff, recruited forthe duration of the outbreak to tend to non-VRE
patients was also taken into account. The cost of dispos-
able material and hygiene procedures was evaluated by
comparison with their cost in the pre-outbreak period.
Surveillance cultures and typing of isolates were valued
using the official tariff for these procedures. The loss of
admissions from spare isolation beds was assessed as the
difference in admission rate in the IDU between the out-
break period and the same period in the preceding year.
It was multiplied by the average cost of stay in the IDU.
Results
Overall, the VRE colonized 13 patients. In one patient,
VRE was also recovered from biliary drainage fluid. Two
of them could be discharged directly from the HBC, the
remaining eleven were treated in the IDU. No new
colonization occurred in the HBC after 21 October — less
than two months after discovery of the index case — and
no case was observed among VRE-negative patients from
the IDU seven weeks after the index case admission. The
isolation sector was cancelled out on 1st December, after
60 days functioning.
The median age of the colonized patients was 59 years
and most of the patients (83%) were male. Their underlying
conditions were the following: hepatocellular carcinoma
(n=7), uncompensated liver cirrhosis (n=9), liver transplant-
ation (n=3), chronic viral hepatitis (n=4), HIV infection
(n=1), cholangiocarcinoma (n=1) and gastric carcinoma
(n=1). Six patients died from their underlying disease or
from other infections. None of these deaths was related to
the VRE. All the patients were successfully decontaminated
as shown by three consecutive negative weekly cultures.
The median length of stay in hospital was 59 days
(range, 22–77 days) whereas it was 29 days (range, 4–68
days) for the six patients that were in intensive care unit.
In most patients, the length of stay was determined by the
underlying condition or complications thereof. Yet, for
one patient, transfer to an aftercare facility was delayed be-
cause of VRE colonization.
Liver transplantation activity, in the HBC was not
impaired by the outbreak: 138 transplantations were
performed in 2007, 130 in 2008 and 116 in 2009.
Hospital costs related to the management of VRE
colonization in these patients are summarized in Table 1.
The cost of infection control measures was four-fold
higher than that of surveillance cultures performed weekly
on colonized patients and VRE-negative contacts from the
IDU and the HBC. These data also show that the direct
cost of barrier precautions was modest.
Discussion
This report indicates that eradicating even a limited out-
break requires substantial efforts and resources. Here,
the outbreak was triggered by a failure in the systematic
Table 1 Cost of the eradication of a vancomycin-resistant
Enterococcus faecium (VRE) outbreak in severely ill
colonized patients (n = 13 patients, 16 stays)
Resources Cost, 2008
Euros*
Infection control measures (A) 60 524
Staffing (overtime plus interim staff) 5 719
Gowns, gloves, single use materials, hydroalcoholic
solutions, disinfection procedures
14 538




Loss of income from spare isolation beds† (B) 110 915
VRE-related hospital loss (A + B) 171 439
*One Euro was approximately equivalent to 1.30 US Dollar or 0.90 UK Pound.
†Loss of 33 admissions, compared to the same period in the preceding year.
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for liver transplantation. Owing to the increasing risk of
VRE infection in transplant recipients, this patient should
have been screened for VRE even if he was admitted in a
non-hepatobiliary ward. Furthermore, the index patient
came from Portugal where the prevalence of VRE among
clinical Enterococcus faecium is approximately 25% [4].
Thus, this patient belonged to a population “at risk” for
VRE colonization. Altogether, this suggests that the active
surveillance program has failed. Such failure has been pre-
viously reported in liver transplant ICUs where active sur-
veillance cultures were performed only on approximately
50% of the patients within 24h of admission [5]. In this
study [5], the failure has been imputed to staff workload. In
our study, same reason may have caused the nonfulfillment
of systematic VRE screening. Altogether, this underlines
that the implementation of the active surveillance program
could have some limitations in the real life setting.
Despite this failure, the time taken to eradicate the VRE
outbreak was rapid as it was less than two months. Indeed,
experiences suggest than any delay in appropriate measures
strengthens the threat of endemicity [6]. In this study, the
involvement of the infection disease unit and hospital man-
agement provided the necessary leadership to enforce strict
control measures. Consistently, no new colonization oc-
curred once colonized patients were identified and trans-
ferred to infectious disease unit. This highlight that the
isolation of colonized patient should not be delayed.
The cost of these measures that include the staffing, the
barrier precautions and contact isolation far exceeded the
cost of active surveillance cultures. However, one might
wonder whether resort to such expensive measure was
mandatory. Indeed, nosocomial pathogen outbreaks often
trigger a debate between advocates of strict control mea-
sures and those who favor a less resource-intensive atti-
tude, preserving usual clinical activity [7]. The Western
Australian (WA) experience has convincingly shown thatenhanced infection control practices are able to prevent
transition from a large hospital outbreak to endemicity [8].
An often-debated measure is isolation, as opposed to in situ
barrier precautions. In many hospitals, isolation sectors
have to be set up by subtracting beds to routine clinical ac-
tivity, which often results in a loss of income for the hos-
pital since beds are then reserved for newly colonized or
infected patients [6,7]. The case for isolation is not fully
substantiated [9]. Simple cohorting may be sufficient where
adequate architectural conditions are met (single-bed
rooms, separate nurse station) and trained staff is present.
Such conditions are often met in infectious disease units.
Finally, the appeal of a resource-sparing infection control
policy should be balanced against the likely and lasting cost
of endemicity [10]. Estimating the cost-benefit of the eradi-
cation of a hospital outbreak is difficult as it depends on
several factors, notably the delay before the next outbreak.
However, Montecalvo et al. [10] showed that even in an
endemic setting strict infection control measures may yield
back up to 2.70 dollars for each dollar spent.
Conclusion
Our report both underlines the burdensome and costly
consequence of the non-compliance with active surveil-
lance programs and the benefice of this program as the
outbreak had been halted owing to the implementation of
the VRE screening. This further suggests that beliefs re-
lated to the potential cost of VRE active surveillance pro-
grams should be balanced with the cost of the eradication
of VRE outbreak. Thus, in the view of reducing health care
cost, effort has to be made to strictly adhere to active sur-
veillance program.
We acknowledge that the data presented here are some-
what anecdotal. They bear only on a limited outbreak, in a
single clinical setting, within the framework of the French
healthcare system. However, the failure resulting in this
outbreak and caused by reduced resource in the summer-
time may likely be happened in the future. Indeed, the
healthcare resource may be reduced due to the economic
crisis. In this setting, our study warns that the improper im-
plementation of active surveillance cultures related to lack
of resource might increase VRE transmission and the asso-
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